According to the Iranian Constitution (Article XIV), no agreement was binding and effective unless it was confirmed by Parliament, but the British and Persian governments immediately proceeded as if the agreement had actually been approved by Parliament and had entered into force. A British military mission arrived in Tehran to organize a new army, while a financial mission led by Armitage Smith took over the Treasury. A railway union was formed to examine the country for possible pipelines, and the first instalment of the loan was paid to Iran. An encrypted telegram from Akbar Mirza Saremoddowleh to the Prime Minister to confirm the receipt of 400,000 Tomans for the conclusion of the 1919 Agreement, half of which was paid to Vossouqoddowleh and the rest divided between him and Nosratoddowleh [N 43956] (page 3) N.S. Fatemi, “ANGLO-PERSIAN AGREEMENT OF 1919”, Encyclopædia Iranica, II/1, p. 59-61, available online at www.iranicaonline.org/articles/anglo-persian-agreement-1919 (accessed December 30, 2012). A copy of the amendment to the 1919 Agreement [F 114-3-36-37] (page 2) Iran`s initiative in Paris had helped develop ideas for its future, ideas that Reza Khan Pahlavi would develop. Iran has begun to show a more modern approach to diplomacy. The British approach showed that outside Europe it would continue to rely on proven colonial and imperial approaches. It is perhaps not surprising that 1919 marked the low point of Iran`s relations with the British and the beginning, albeit slow, of the end of British political rule over Iran. Seyyed Zia`addin Tabatabai`s telegram to Nasserolmolk, in which he described the situation in the country and stressed the need to end the 1919 agreement, called for negotiations with Lord Curzon and assured him of the continuation of mutual relations against the cancellation of the agreement [GH 1250] The fact that secret negotiations were conducted provoked the anger of Persian politicians. They accused the government that while their delegation was waiting for the Versailles peace conference (see below Anṣārī, ʿAlī-qolī Khan), and the country was eagerly awaiting the British evacuation, their government had conspired in a secret treaty. The Paris Peace Council feared that the secret treaty would make Persia a British protectorate (Associated Press, August 28, 1919), as there were no plans to include the treaty in the archives of the League of Nations.
Letter from Hajj Hossein Aminozzarb to the Prime Minister on the need for talks with the British to end the 1919 treaty due to domestic and foreign objections and public hatred of this agreement [N 4556] The document was denounced worldwide as hegemonic, especially in the United States, which also had plans for access to Iranian oil fields. Eventually, the Anglo-Persian Agreement was officially terminated by the Majlis on June 22, 1921. Oliver Bast, “The Persian Mission at the Peace Conference in 1919: A New Interpretation” in Oliver Bast (ed.), Persia and The Great War, Iranian Library 52 (Tehran; Leuven: Peeters, 2002) It took six months of secret negotiations to prepare the agreement announced on August 9, 1919. The preamble to the agreement ended with the following words: “By virtue of the close friendly relations that have existed in the past between the two governments, and in the conviction that it is in the essential and mutual interest of both in the future that these ties be strengthened and that the progress and prosperity of Persia be promoted to the maximum.” In most of the first agreement, the British government agreed to the following points: In the end, the Iranians did not present their wishes to the Paris Peace. The failure of Iranian diplomacy revolved around certain problems that the Iranians simply could not avoid. The Iranians depended on British support, which was not granted because Britain had its own plans for Iran and intended to develop those plans in the Anglo-Persian agreement. The Anglo-Persian agreement shocked Iranian delegates in Paris, who saw it as a violation of Article 10 of the Charter of the League of Nations. The American press reported that “the admission of Persia into the British Empire seems to be a process in full swing.” In Iran, the excitement led to rumors that Ahmad Shah, who had felt compelled to sign the deal, had fled to Constantinople immediately after the treaty was signed. Delegates had a feat in Paris in achieving success in becoming a founding member of the League of Nations and achieving at least one goal. 2. He promises to “provide, at the expense of the Persian Government, the services of all technical advisers deemed necessary for the various departments of the Persian administration after consultation between the two Governments. These consultants will be appointed under contract and will be endowed with appropriate powers, the nature of which will be agreed between the Persian government and the advisers.
The new government faced many problems: the treasury was depleted, British troops roamed the country, armed rebels looted cities and invaded the streets, and the Bolsheviks knocked on the gates of northern Persia. At that time, England turned to Persia for an agreement of friendship and alliance (Woṯūq-al-dawla Declaration on the 6th Session of the Majlis, 1926). Letter from Hajj Mirza Hassan Khan to Prime Minister Vossouqoddowleh congratulating him on the conclusion of the Anglo-Iranian agreement [N 54295] (page 2) A telegram from the London Embassy on the speeches of the Deputy Foreign Minister on the possibility of Iran cancelling the 1919 agreement due to its non-ratification in the National Assembly [N4556] Controversial agreement that grants Britain broad economic privileges in Iran. What ultimately destroyed the agreement was the claim that Prime Minister Woṯūq-al-dawla, Finance Minister Akbar Mīrzā Ṣārem-al-dawla and Foreign Minister Fīrūz Mīrzā Noṣrat-al-dawla, collectively referred to in British sources as “the triumvirate”, had received a sum of β 131,000 to ensure the ratification of the agreement by the Majlis. The rumours were later confirmed in the House of Commons in November 1920 (Wright, op. cit., p. 179; Olson, op. cit. cit., pp.
237-40). According to Bāmdād (Reǰāl III, p. 116), who does not name its source, the bribe was later extorted from the triumvirate by Reżā Shah. Aḥmad Shah Qāǰār, despite his subsequent opposition to the agreement, had also demanded a lifetime subsidy of 20,000 tomans per month and assurances of British support for himself and the survival of the Qajar dynasty in exchange for his support for the agreement (Olson, op. cit., p. 237). Woṯūq-al-dawla fell in Tīr, 1299 Š./June 1920, and the new Prime Minister, Ḥasan Khan Mošīr-al-dawla, suspended the agreement on the grounds that it had not yet been ratified by the Majlis. It was eventually annulled by the next cabinet under Sayyed Żīāʾ-al-dīn Ṭabāṭabāʾī and the unanimous vote of the fourth majlis. At a solemn reception, Moshaver al-Mamalek was encouraged by President Wilson and, with the help of the Italian delegation, Iranian participation was put on the agenda on February 18, 1919. At the Council of Ten meeting, Arthur Balfour insisted that Iranians, as non-warriors, should not be allowed to participate. Finally, further progress has been made in the Council, notably by Secretary of State Robert Lansing and President Wilson.
In fact, on two occasions, President Wilson raised the issue of Iran`s admission to the Council of Ten. Margaret Macmillan, Peacemakers, The Paris Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War (London: John Murray, 2002) The Iranian delegation arrived in Paris in early 1919. As they prepared to implement their diplomatic charm offensive, Vosuq al-Dowleh asked them to wait and postpone their attempt to access the peace conference. Around the same time, they had heard Arthur Balfour, the British foreign secretary who was in Paris, that further negotiations between the two governments were taking place in Tehran. Lord Curzon had already begun negotiating the Anglo-Persian Agreement through Sir Percy Cox. The delegates now feared that their work in Paris would be undermined by Vosuq al-Dowleh, whose affection for the British had always been known. Within a few weeks, Vosuq al-Dowleh`s waiting order was lifted and they began their diplomatic campaign. H. Nicholson, Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919-1925. A Study in Post-War Diplomacy, New York, 1939. The second agreement provided for a £2,000,000 loan from the British to the Persian government at an interest rate of 7%, payable monthly.
The guarantee of this loan was all revenues and customs revenues of the ports of the Persian Gulf. The Anglo-Iranian agreement, signed on 9 September. Signed in Tehran in August 1919, Britain was to provide administrative advisers, officers, ammunition and equipment for the formation of a unified force at Iran`s expense; support for railway construction and tariff revisions; cooperate in the confiscation of war reparations of warring parties; and to lend Iran £2 million at an annual interest rate of 7%. In return, Britain gained a monopoly on the supply of administrative advisers, as well as experts and military equipment, and revenues from Iranian customs were promised to repay the loan. The agreement sparked a bitter controversy. Iranian negotiators believed he would fund administrative and military reforms, avoid social revolution, and help maintain order. .